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REPLY
THE LOWER COURT'S SUBMISSION OF A THRESHOLD
ISSUE TO THE JURY WAS NOT AUTHORIZED B;Y THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE NOR PURPOSE OF THE NO-FAULT
STATUTORY SCHEME. THE COURT'S RULING ALSO
VIOLATED THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND
THE LAW OF THE CASE. THE COURT'S ACTION
PREJUDICED PLAINTIFF'S CASE.
Defendant ignores the plain language of U.C.A. § 31A-22-309(l)(a) and the
Utah no-fault statutory scheme. These statutes do not establish an additional burden of proof
at trial for car accident victims nor do they provide tortfeasors a tactic to undermine cases at
trial. On the contrary, the plain language states that car accident victims cannot maintain
a cause of action until they have sustained medical expenses in excess of $3,000.
While ignoring the plain language of the no-fault statutory scheme, defendant
does acknowledge, and even quotes, Utah appellate case law stating that the purpose of §
31A-22-309(l)(a) and the no-fault statutory scheme is to screen less-severe car accident
injury cases from the court system and "to create a more efficient and equitable method for
handling the bulk of personal injury claims in a cost effective manner." See defendant's brief
p. 5, Prince v. Bear River Mut Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68,1fl[ 15, 17, 56 and Warren v. Melville,
937 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah App. 1997). Yet, defendant is silent on the subject of how that
purpose is accomplished by having a jury determine the threshold question at the end of a
full-fledged trial. Indeed, defendant can have nothing to say on this point. In no way is the
screening purpose accomplished by having a jury determine whether the case belonged in
the court system or whether it should have been resolved through the no- fault system. That

does not conserve judicial or litigant resources, ease the burden on the courts, or efficiently
handle less severe car-accident injury cases. To the contrary, interpreting the no-fault
statutes to allow tortfeasors to ignore the statutory screening process and, instead, raise
threshold at trial, makes the statutes null and void.
Screening of less severe car-accident injury cases is efficiently accomplished
through the plain language of the no-fault statutory scheme. Prince explains, in detail, how
the screening process works. See Prince Tfi[ 15-22. It includes evaluation and payment by the
PIP carrier of necessary and reasonable medical bills related to the accident, regardless of
fault, up to the statutory limit of $3,000. Id. at f 16, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(l)(a)
(2001).

The PIP insurer can investigate and dispute the relatedness, necessity, and/or

reasonableness of bills submitted for payment. Id. at ^ 1 8. 1 If the PIP carrier's investigation
leads to a denial of payment of bills, then the insured can bring a first-party insurance
contract claim for court determination as to whether the bills should be covered. Id.
Where, through PIP insurer approval, an injured party has exhausted $3,000
in PIP medical bill payments, then he is entitled to "bring claims against tort-feasors for pain
and suffering, as well as for economic losses, in excess of the statutory PIP limit." Id. at f 19,
quoting Bear River Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wall, 1999 UT 33 at 110. As is apparent, the $3,000
threshold was established to work in connection with the $3,000 personal injury protection
("PIP") coverage of of U.C.A.§ 31A-22-307(l)(a). Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d

^uch was the case in Prince, where Bear River hired a doctor who evaluated the
insured and his records, and disputed that the injured had incurred $3,000 in medical bills.
Id. at Tit 3, 4.

1197, 1200 (Utah 1980). This understanding of how the screening process works was
manifested as early as 1980, when the Utah Supreme Court, giving its first overview of
Utah's no-fault statutory scheme, stated,
Until the threshold requirements are met, the
injured party is limited to his direct benefit
coverage. If his injuries meet the threshold
requirements, then he may maintain a claim for
general damages.
Ivie at 1200, Wall at | 8. (Emphasis added).
Note, that Ivie did not say that a determination will be made at the end of trial
as to whether a car accident victim can maintain a claim for general damages. The court
understood the plain language and purpose of the no-fault scheme and acknowledged that
exhaustion of PIP medical bill benefits was the prerequisite to maintaining a claim in court
for general damages.2
The screening process of the Utah no-fault statutory scheme, as set forth in its
plain language, prevents filing of nearly all car-accident injury cases until the injured party
has met the $3,000 threshold or one of the other threshold requirements. Only in those rare
cases where an automobile accident victim or his attorney do not understand the threshold
requirements, is a non-threshold lawsuit filed. In such circumstances, tortfeasors may move

2

Defendant argues that applying the plain language of the statute would improperly
impose a burden on defendants to prove, prior to trial, that plaintiffs medical expenses did
not exceed $3,000. This is incorrect. The statute and statutory scheme say nothing about
tortfeasors having to prove anything. Screening is accomplished through PIP insurer
investigation, evaluation, approval or disapproval.
-3-

to dismiss. One such case, cited in defendant's brief, was McNair v. Farris, 944 P.2d 392
(Utah App. 1997). See defendant's brief p. 5. There, McNair filed suit after incurring only
$1,222.20 in medical expenses from an auto accident. Id. at 393. Defendant moved for
summary judgment, including an affidavit from the no-fault carrier, State Farm Insurance
Company, establishing the $1,222.20 amount. Id. The motion was granted. Id. at 392-93.
In the case at bar, the screening process of the no-fault statutory scheme was
accomplished. Plaintiff submitted medical bills to his PIP insurer, State Farm Insurance
Company, which evaluated the bills, paying some and rejecting some. The PIP insurer paid
more than $3,000 in medical bills as related, necessary, and reasonable. R. 226-229.
Plaintiff, as permitted by the statutes' plain language, then filed his lawsuit for general
damages, as well as for future medical expenses.3 Defendant never made any motion to
contest that plaintiff had met threshold and had a right to maintain a cause of action for
general damages.4 In fact, to the contrary, defendant stipulated ten months before trial, on

3

The lower court also clearly erred by prohibiting the jury from awarding future
medical expenses unless it found $3,000 in medical expenses, since its ruling contradicts the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(l)(a). R. 168-69.
4

In plaintiffs principal brief, plaintiff set forth what he understood to be a pre-trial
procedure that defendant could have utilized, but failed to utilize, to contest the PIP insurer's
evaluation and approval of medical bills in excess of $3,000. See Utah Code Ann. 31A-22307(2)(e)(i). However, defendant has taken the position that this statutory provision did not
afford him this right. If defendant is correct in his interpretation, then the legislature did not
intend to allow tortfeasors any way to challenge the screening process it created through the
no-fault scheme. Either way, plaintiff in the case at bar satisfied threshold, his meeting of
threshold was unchallenged, and he was entitled to maintain his claims for damages at trial
without a threshold issue.
-4-

March 26, 2003, that the only issues to be resolved by the jury at trial were the causation of
plaintiffs injuries and the amount of plaintiff s damages. R. 35-36. The issue of threshold
was not included in that stipulation. Id. This stipulation was submitted to the court in the
form of an order for signature, and the court eventually signed that order two days before
trial. R. 83-84.5 In relevant part, that order stated,
The issues presented to the jury for decision will
be limited to proximate causation of Plaintiffs
injuries and to the amount of Plaintiff s damages.
R. 84. Thus, not only were the plain language and purpose of the no-fault statutory scheme
violated by the court's submission of a threshold issue to the jury, the court ignored the
waiver of any such issue by the defendant and failed to follow the law of the case6 it ordered
two days before the start of trial.
Nevertheless, defendant argues that the court should ignore the statutes' plain
language and purpose; defendant's failure to contest threshold by motion and his waiver by
stipulation; and the law of the case in favor of construing the no-fault statutory screening
process as creating a new burden of proof at trial for car accident victims. Defendant's
request must be rejected for several reasons. First, this court "has no power to rewrite the

5

Defendant fails to respond to the fact of the stipulation and order which plaintiff
noted and argued in his principal brief.
6

Regarding the law of the case doctrine, a respected treatise states, "The standards
announced for departing from the law of the case commonly demand strong justification."
18B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 670 (2002). There
was no justification, and certainly no strong justification, for the court's departure in the case
at bar.
-5-

statute to conform to an intention not expressed." Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d,
367, 370 (Utah 1994). The interpretation "must be based on the language used" and courts
are not to infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Id. In regard to the
no-fault statutory scheme, the legislature's intent was clear. This scheme does not authorize
a practice of having juries resolve a threshold issue.
Defendant's reliance on CTv. Johnson, 1999 UT 35,977 P.2d479 (Utah 1999)
is misplaced. There the court was also not authorized to "rewrite the statute to conform to
an intention not expressed." Id. at f 31. Nor did the court attempt to do so. The court
simply accepted the defendant's assertion that plaintiff could not be awarded general
damages upon a jury finding of $339 in past medical expenses, since the plaintiff did not
contest application of the no-fault threshold to the jury's verdict. There was thus no issue
before the court as to whether the no-fault statutory scheme authorizes submission of a
threshold question to the jury. Indeed, it is clear the jury was not even give such an
interrogatory, because the jury was allowed to find damages for the plaintiff, including
$10,000 in general damages. Id at f 3. As Utah appellate courts have never been directly
confronted with the issue, this is an issue of first impression and worthy of appellate
consideration.7
Second, construing the statutes to allow threshold to be addressed at trial,
renders the statutes meaningless, null and void. Rather than being allowed, as contemplated

defendant also cites Tingey v. Christensen, 987 P.2d 588,1999 UT 68; however, the
issue at bar was not before that court.
-6-

by the statutes, to freely pursue damages after satisfying the threshold requirement, caraccident victims must face nullification of their right to recover general damages by a
threshold challenge at trial, including to the amounts, necessity, and reasonableness of each
of their medical bills. Such a construction also wastes judicial resources, contrary to the
purpose of the statutory scheme, because the threshold issue was either already resolved
prior to trial through the statutory process, or should have been contested and resolved prior
to trial, assuming Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(2)(e)(i) gives tortfeasors a procedure for
contesting the PIP carrier's evaluation. See footnote 4.
Third, the court's decision in the case at bar to allow threshold to be an issue
at trial and to preclude all damages unless the jury found threshold by a preponderance, was
unfair and grossly prejudicial to plaintiffs case. Based on the plain language and purpose
of the statute, the stipulation of the parties, and the courts order delineating the issues for jury
resolution, threshold was not to be an issue at trial. Had plaintiff timely been informed that
defendant would be given the opportunity to seek a no cause finding through attack of
specific medical treatments and bills as unrelated, unnecessary, or unreasonable, plaintiff
would have prepared his case for trial very differently. That preparation would have included
calling at trial all the medical providers who treated plaintiff for his acute injuries to dispel
the doubts defendant created on a few treatments and bills to get plaintiffs preponderate
medical expenses under the $3,000 threshold in the eyes of the jury.8
8

Plaintiff noted in his principal brief that the prejudicial effect of the court's ruling
was compounded by the fact that the court would not allow plaintiff to demonstrate to the
-7-

As noted in Plaintiffs principal brief, plaintiff prepared and proved his case
on the required elements. The jury found that defendant's negligence proximately caused
injury to plaintiff and plaintiff should have been awarded general damages and damages for
past and future medical expenses. Instead, the trial was unfairly transformed to a surprise
trial over whether plaintiff had meet the $3,000 threshold and the jury was prohibited from
awarding any damages.
CONCLUSION
Under the applicable standard of review, the court should give no deference
to the trial court's misinterpretation and misapplication of the no-fault statutory scheme. It
was legal error and prejudicial to plaintiffs case, for the court to create an additional burden
of proof for plaintiff by prohibiting an award of damages until the jury found, by a
preponderance of evidence, that plaintiff had met the no-fault threshold. The plain language
provides for determination of threshold through the PIP insurer's evaluation and approval
or disapproval of medical bills, not through jury determination of threshold at trial. The
language and purposes of the statutory scheme are made null and void through raising the no-

jury that threshold had been met under the terms of the no-fault statutes, since plaintiff s PIP
insurer had evaluated and approved medical bills in excess of $3,000. The unfairness of the
court's exclusion was heightened by the fact that State Farm Insurance Company,
defendant's liability carrier and the real party in interest, was the same company that had
evaluated and approved payment of medical bills in excess of $3,000. It seemed inconsistent
for State Farm to argue at trial that plaintiff had not met threshold when State Farm had
previously acknowledged that plaintiff had met threshold.
-8-

fault threshold issue at trial. The court should validate the plain language of the no-fault
scheme and give effect to its purpose by reversing the lower court's error.
The court also erred and prejudiced plaintiffs case by disregarding the
stipulation of the parties and the law of the case, through its own court order, which limited
the issues for jury resolution and did not include a threshold issue.
Plaintiff proved all required elements and was entitled to an award of damages,
including general damages and past and future medical expenses from the jury.
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully requests that the court reverse the lower
court's judgment and denial of plaintiff s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and remand with the order to enter judgment in behalf of plaintiff, along with an order for
a new trial, solely on the amount of plaintiff s damages.
DATED AND SUBMITTED this 25th day of April, 2005.

I\
Matthew H. Raty, Attjafiiey for Ai ellant
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